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1. INTRODUCTION 
1.1 Aims 
The 1985 Transport Act changed the regulatory constraints imposed 
on the British stage bus industry and has had important impacts 
on competition and market structure. In the discussion that 
preceded and immediately followed the Act a wide range of micro- 
economic theories and models were developed to explain possible 
impacts. The general aim of this paper is to review the 
literature in this field. More specifically, it will be attempted 
to develop a suitable taxonomy of the different models and 
theories of market structure that have been developed, common 
strands throughout the literature will be highlighted and models 
(and theories) reviewed in light of recent empirical evidence. 
This paper will act as a background document to subsequent work 
including an examination of contestability in Hereford (Preston, 
1988) and Preston (Mackie and Preston, 1988), the use of games 
theory to explain competitive outcomes, predatory behaviour, 
collusion and mergers/acquisitions (Preston, 1989) and an 
assessment of the role of the minibus (Martinez, 1988, Preston, 
1989). 
1.2 Outline 
Hence, in section 2 regulation theory will briefly be examined. 
Our starting point will be to examine the history of regulatory 
constraint of the British stage bus industry. This history will 
then be re-examined in the light of regulation theory. It will be 
stressed that the 1985 Transport Act modifies the regulatory 
constraints rather than removes them all together. The Act also 
acts as a focus for a number of other changes including the 
privatisation of the National Bus Company, the commercialisation - 
of PTE and Municipal bus operations, the introduction of 
competitive tendering and the strengthening of some aspects of 
regulation (e.g. quality regulation, competition law). 
Furthermore, the Act was accompanied by the 1985 Local Goverment 
Act (which abolished the Metropolitan County Councils) and the 
accompanying reductions in subsidy levels. 
In section 3 we go on to review the models of competition that 
have been developed in order to assess the effect of the 1985 
Act. A number of model types are reviewed, including classical 
oligopoly, horizontal product differentiation, vertical product 
differentiation and simulation models. It is noted that the 
welfare implications of all these model types are equivocal. In 
section 4, the models' implications are then compared with the 
intitial experience of bus deregulation in Britain. In 
particular, a number of ambient circumstances and competitive 
practices with regard to bus competition, so far, are detected. 
In section 5 we go on to examine the market structure of the 
urban bus industry. It is shown that we are dealing, in most 
cases, with competition amongst the few i.e. imperfect 
competition. Given this, the theory of contestability is examined 
and its applicability to the urban bus industry studied. It is 
shown that, for a number of reasons, the urban bus industry may 
not be contestable. - .- 
In section 6 we attempt to draw some conclusions. Our. main 
finding is that the compexities of the real world limit the 
usefulness of micro-economic models based on over simplifying 
assumptions. A possible way forward, using game theory and based 
on conventional oligopoly (or duopoly) models, is suggested. 
1.3 Characteristics of the Staae Bus Industrv 
Before continuing it may be useful to consider some of the 
characteristics of the stage bus industry. The following should 
be noted: 
1. Demand is derived i.e. utility, in most cases, is not derived 
from bus travel, per se, but from the opportunities that are 
achieved through travel. 
2. Adopting terms from spatial analysis, production location may 
be thought of as offered departure time, consumer location as 
prefered departure time (with re-scheduling cost being a form 
of transport cost) and price as money fare. 
3. Individual demand is for travel from place i to j for purpose 
p at time t, with the importance of the time constraint being 
dependent on the nature of p. Market demand is a summation of 
individual demands. Normally market demand is related to a 
geagraphic area based either on a network of routes (such as 
in a free standing town), a group of routes (a corridor) or a 
single route. 
4. For any demand, Tijpt, there may be different routes, 
vehicles etc. offered. These different routes etc. may be 
thought of as differentiated products 
- 
5. Output can not be stored, it must be consumed at the time 
produced or wasted. 
6 .  The cost of output includes not only producer costs but also 
user costs in terms of in-vehicle, walk and wait time. In 
particular, it is important that wait time is a negative 
function of output, leading to a scale economy that has been 
termed the 'Mohring effect1. 
7. The bus industry has important external effects on road 
congestion, accidents, the environment etc. 
2. REGULATION THEORY 
2.1 Recrulatorv Historv of the British Bus Industrv 
The history of the British stage bus industry has been documented 
by Hibbs (1968). The pre-cursors of regulation were the Town 
Police Clauses Acts of 1847 and 1890 which controlled the taxi- 
cab and horse drawn bus industries respectively. The rapid growth 
of the motor bus industry in the 1920s resulted in problems of 
over supply, 'piratet operators and tcurious old (driving) 
practicest, such as racing to stops or hanging back and led to 
demands for a similar form of regulation. Thus, concern with 
wasteful competition (st-ressed by Gwilliam, 1964) and- safety 
(stressed by Glaister and Mulley, 1983) led to the 1930 Road 
Traffic Act and the resultant regulatory system of Road Service 
Licences (RSLs), administered by Traffic Commissioners. This 
system evolved over the years as emphasis became placed on 
protecting existing operators and maintaining a network of 
services through cross subsidy, whilst Traffic Commissioners 
began to make wide use of their powers to attach fare and 
timetable restrictions to RSLs. In addition, the increasing 
concentration of the industry lead to the creation of territorial 
monopolies, although train and, inreasingly, car were close 
substitutes. 
The 1930 Act remained largely unchanged for 50 years, despite the 
important role played by the British Transport Commission 
between 1947 and 1953 and the 1968 Transport Act, which created 
the PTEs and deregulated the road haulage industry (although this 
had its basis in theories of 'pure1 competition and we shall see 
this is in marked contrast to the stage bus industry). Indeed the 
1978 Transport Act, if anything, strengthened the existing 
regulatory system. 
The 1930 Act was partially repealed by the 1980 Transport Act 
which deregulated the express bus industry (and was subsequently 
studied by Kilvington and Cross, 1986, and Douglas, 1986) and 
the relaxation of some aspects of stage bus regulation (Savage, 
1985) and set up trial areas in parts of Devon, Hereford and 
Norfolk (Fairhead and Balcombe, 1984, Evans and Hoyes, 1984). 
Following the 'Buses1 White Paper (Cmnd 9300) and a subsequent 
round of academic debate (see Bannister et seq. 1985), Ifull1 
deregulation of the stage bus industry was heralded by the 1985 
Transport Act (in fact it will be shown in 2.3 that this was very 
much deregulation with rules). 
Hibbs (1985) in an international study notes that bus and coach - 
regulation is widespread, although quality regulation is slightly 
more common than quantity regulation. A trend towards 
liberalisation is detected, particularly in Chile, New Zealand, 
the U.K. and U.S. Two forms of regulation are identified: 
arbitration, which is predominant in Canada, the U.K. and U.S. 
and is related to Common Law, and franchise, which is predominant 
in continental Europe and has its root in Civil Law. 
2.2 Reaulation Theorv and the British Bus Industrv 
The main study of regulation theory is that of Posner (1974). 
Regulation is based on the assumption that economic markets 
operate inefficiently or inequitably (or both) and that 
regulation is relatively costless. Regulation mainly effects 
concentrated industries or industries that generate externalities 
(such as the bus industry). Thus, the 1930 Act might be seen as a 
product of public interest theory with the main consideration 
being safety. The fact that regulation has subsequently needed to 
be lifted might be explained by mismangement within the 
regulatory agencies (for example, it might be argued that the 
Traffic Commissioners over stepped their powers). 
An alternative explanation for the 1930 Act might be provided by 
interest group (or capture) theory. In particular, it has been 
shown by Hibbs that the rail companies, tram companies and large 
bus operators (such as Thomas Tilling and British Electric 
Traction) were all involved in pressing for bus regulation. 
Alternatively, regulation may be viewed as a product allocated in 
accordance with the laws of supply and demand, with demand being 
particularly great where cartelization is either infeasible (due 
to the large number of parties involved) or too costly (both of 
which may apply to the bus industry) (Stigler, 1971). Advantages 
of regulation include the ability to develop a system of cross- 
subsidy which, if there are limits on external finance, may be 
shown to increase net welfare (Gwilliam et al., 1985) and the 
ability to develop second best pricing in order to take into 
account external effects such as road congestion. The 
disadvantages of regulation have been outlined by Kahn (1971) and 
include slackness of management, exploitation of the monopoly 
power of organised labour, overinvestment and lack of innovation. 
The Buses White Paper saw most of these problems applying to the 
British bus industry. 
An interesting synthesis of the above arguments has been provided 
by Needham (1983) who detected a regulation life cycle of the 
form shown by Figure 1. 
Fiaure 1 Requlation Life Cvcle Theorv 
Demands for Regulatory forms Effects of regulation on - - _  
regulation --*and constraints 'decision makers behaviour I 
b I 
k 
--Feedback - political and economic disequilibrium rulest- - -1 
2.3 The 1985 Trans~ort Act 
It has already been pointed out that to think of the 1985 Act as 
'full1 deregulation is a misnomer. Quality regulation remains 
and, in theory, has been tightened whilst PTEs and County 
Councils (or their equivalents) can put unprofitable services out 
to tender. Tendered services account for about 17% of local bus 
mileage (Department of Transport, 1988) and it is a weakness that 
much of the work discussed in later sections concentrates only on 
commercial services. The difficult interface between commercial 
and tendered services has been stressed (Buchanan, 1986), with it 
being particularly difficult to design sensible tendered services 
that do not, in some way, undermine the commercial network. 
Moreover, given most authorities policy of, wherever possible, 
buying back mileage, it is becoming apparent that judicious 
registration of services can enable the existing operator to 
exploit economies of scope when bidding for the resulting 
tenders. The literature on the contracting out of bus services is 
currently limited but is developing, both with respect to the 
tendering process in London (Higginson, 1987) and elsewhere 
(Tyson, 1987, and unpublished work by Hensher). 
In addition, added regulation stems from the increased powers 
granted to the Traffic Commissioners and the application of 
Restrictive Practices legislation to bus services and stations, 
thus involving the Office of Fair Trading in the stage bus 
industry. British competition law has been criticised, 
particularly due to its ineffectiveness (see for example Hay, 
1985). Recent experience in the bus industry, for example the 
OFT1s ruling on access ta Newport bus station in the Isle of 
Wight, tends to confirm this, whilst inconsistency has been 
another problem, for example the differing Traffic Commissioner 
rulings on what constitutes a duplication. Moreover,' the 
inapplicability of monopoly and merger legislation may, in time, 
be seen to be a major drawback. 
Furthermore, the 1985 Act has had important effects on the 
ownership in the bus industry. The National Bus Company (NBC) 
was split into around 70 subsidiaries and all but one (the 
Victoria Coach Station was transferred to London Regional 
Transport) have been privatised, yielding around £300 million. 
There has, however, been a tendency for companies to 
reagglomerate as witnessed by the Caldaire, Drawlane and 
Stagecoach grups of bus companies. Similarly, the PTE and 
Municipal bus fleets have been re-structured as separate 
companies at 'arm's length' from their directly elected 
authorities/committees, with privatisation (and possibly 
fragmentation) likely options in the near future. A number of 
commentators, for example Farrington (1985), see privatisation 
and deregulation inextricably inter-related. However, Waterson 
(1986), in a study of publicly and privately owned natural 
monopolies, found that external constraint structures, internal 
organisation and management structure and emoluments varies 
significantly with ownership. 
Lastly, it should noted that the 1983 Transport Act (which 
required PTEs to publish three year plans), the 1985 Local 
Government Act (which abolished the Metropolitan Counties) and 
the associated policy of reducing central government support to 
local authorities have had strong effects on the bus industry, 
particularly in Metropolitan areas. For example, between 1985 and 
1987 there has been a real cut in public transport subsidy in the 
seven Metropolitan areas of around 26% (Gomez-Ibanez et al., 
1987). This reduction in subsidy has overshadowed any effect 
caused by deregulation. However, Gomez-Ibanez argues that changes 
in fares (+29%) and reductions in services (-5%) in the 
Metropolitan areas were sufficient to cover only two-thirds to 
three-quarters of expenditure cuts, and this is evidence that 
competition has led to efficiency gains equivalent to 4% of total 
costs (the corresponding figure produced by the Department of 
Transport (1988) for Great Britain was 7%). Of course, whether 
reducing subsidy, either in the Metropolitan Areas or elsewhere, 
is socially efficient is a separate issue (see Glaister et al., 
1987) 
3. MODELS OF BUS COMPETITION 
In this section four broad types of model will be identified: 
models based directly on classical oligopoly theory, models based 
on horizontal product differentiation, models based on vertical 
product differentiation and simulation models. These categories 
should not be thought of as mutually exclusive but merely reflect 
different degrees of emphasis and complexity. These models are 
important because either implicitly or explicitly they have been 
used to predict the effects of deregulation. As evidence about 
the post deregulation situation emerges, emphasis can be changed 
to finding models which best explain or are consistent with 
observed events (i.e. a normative assessment) and models which 
aid understanding of the-economic characterisitics of the local 
bus industry (i.e. a positive assessment). 
3.1 Classical Oliao~olv Models 
Most of the models we shall discuss have some foundation in 
oligopoly theory. An example is the model developed by Savage 
(1985) which is based on Stackelberg's duopoly model with simple 
assumptions regarding the firms1 reaction functions and profit 
functions. Figure 2 shows that for any given profit level a locus 
of fare and frequency combinations are possible, with differing 
implications in terms of social welfare. It is argued that 
deregulation may lead to either social welfare gain or loss 
depending on the original position of E (i.e. whether over 
optimal or sub optimal regulated provision), costs and choice on 
timings. Given that headrunning is the most likely strategy, at 
least in the short run, it is argued that wasteful competition 
will result and hence social welfare loss is more likely than 
social welfare gains. Although this model helps explain likely 
outcomes, the approach is descriptive rather than predictive and, 
as it stands, lacks empirical basis. 
Other oligopoly models that re-appear in the literature include 
the Cournot duopoly model, the kinked demand curve associated 
with Sweezy and the limit pricing theory models associated with 
Bain and the modifications of Sylos-Labini and Modigliani. (For a 
discussion of these and other classical oligopoly models see a 
standard textbook, for example Koutsoyiannis, 1979). 
3.2 Horizontal Differentiation Models 
Horizontal product differentiation models are based on the 
assumption that as fixed costs associated with entry decrease or 
the size of the economy increases then the market can result in a 
large number of closely located firms and hence, in a 
Chamberlinian configuration (i.e. perfect monopolistic 
competition), price competition would occur. Moreover, even if 
all goods were offered at the same price consumers would differ 
as to their most preferred choice. The micro-economic literature 
in this field has been based on models of spatial competition, 
derived from Hotelling's ice cream salesman problem (and reviewed 
by Graitson, 1982). These models may be easily extended to a 
temporal setting which is particularly relevant in transport 
(Greenhut et al., 1987, Ch 17) . 
Evans (1987) has developed such a model for the bus industry, 
which is itself based on the theoretical work of Novshek (1980) 
and Salop (1979). This model is based on a large number of 
assumptions: 
i. 
ii. 
iii. 
vi. 
vii. 
viii 
ix. 
All operators have common costs 
Demand and costs are the same under all economic regimes 
All operators and passengers have complete information about 
services and fares 
Operators have information about demand and common costs 
Each passenger has a preferred departure time but is 
indifferent between backwards and forward rescheduling 
The day is infinitely long 
The demand curve for travel is exponential 
All buses have spare-capacity - 
Traffic conditions are such that journey times are the same 
throughout the day 
x. It is assumed that departure times and fares of other 
operators are fixed (i.e. a form of Zero Conjectural 
Variation (ZCV)). Alternatively, it might be assumed that 
fares cuts (or frequency increases) will be matched but fare 
rises (or frequency decreases) (i.e. modified ZCV, as 
studied by Novshek, 1980) will not be matched. 
Clearly, most of these ten assumptions are unrealistic but 
unlikely to dramatically influence results. However, other 
(possibly linear) demand functions might be worthy of 
consideration, whilst we shall see in later sections that both 
the infinite time and the ZCV assumptions are unrealistic. 
Evans compares four economic regimes: competition, monopoly, 
unconstrained maximisation of net economic benefit and 
maximisation of net economic benefit subject to a break-even 
constraint. space does not permit detailed restatement of the 
model but the key equations are: 
- f/v -(f8 - f + ch)/2v 
q = 2 L v  
-
e (1 - e 1 (1) 
C 
where q = total passengers, L = potential passengers per hour, v 
= fare parameter (valuation of journey), c = rescheduling 
parameter, f = fare of representative bus, fv = fare of following 
bus, h = headway. 
and 
where s = consumer surplus, g = total costs, F = fixed costs, m = 
marginal costs, p = profit, b = net economic benefit. 
Analysis is performed with some assumed values for v, c, F and m 
(empirical evidence is required here) and results are modified to 
take into account discrete bus units and finite time cycles. Not 
surprisingly, it is found that competition is most likely where L 
is high and under a competitive regime potential demand below 
about one passenger per minute will be left unserved (did the 
commercial registrations conform to this ?). Moreover, it is 
found that, compared to other regimes, competition will lead to 
high frequency, high fare combinations (and it does appear that 
in most areas of competition frequency has increased whilst fare 
has remained stable or increased slightly). Compared to 
maximising net economic benefit subject to a break-even 
constraint, it is shown that competition leads to about a 10-12% 
decrease in net economic benefit. However, in order to determine 
the net welfare effects of deregulation the pre-deregulation 
economic regime need to be suitably defined and account needs to 
be taken of cost savings. If finite time cycles, and hence 
discrete headways, are considered, the results change in that, 
under competition, super normal profits may be made, natural 
monopolies may exist, instabilities increase and there is further 
loss of consumer surplus relative to the maximum. - 
Another example of the use of spatial competition models is the 
work of Foster and Golay (1986) (itself derivative of the earlier 
work of Hay, 1976) in showing that nncurious old (driving) 
practicesnn may be consistent with equilibrium and in the public 
interest (for example missing stops when the bus is full or near 
full and turning short when the bus is empty and there is demand 
for a service in the opposite direction). Moreover, they argue 
that although practices such as predatory loss-leading and 
headrunning are not welfare optimal neither are they likely to 
exist under equilibrium conditions. (The fact that, for example, 
headrunning is particularly common place in a competitive 
environment suggests that in many areas these equilibrium 
conditions do not exist). Somewhat ironically, Foster and Golay 
also suggest legislation (= regulation) may assist in the 
process, for example if operators are forced to maintain to 
published schedules an equilibrium position will be rapidly 
achieved (the problem here is largely one of policing). It is 
also interesting to note that predictability of demand and road 
congestion (predictability of driving schedules) may be factors 
affecting on-the-road competition. 
It should be noted that both the above analyses are weakened by 
the limiting assumptions concerning ZCV and functional 
specification. A generalised model of spatial competition has 
been developed by Capozza and Van Order (1978) based on a 
fundamental pricing equation: 
1 
c =  p [ 1 +  I (6)  
e (Rr P) 
where c = constant marginal cost, p = price and e(R,p) = the 
aggregate demand elasticy of the market share R. This pricing 
equation applies irrespective of the nature of the competitive 
process. Further it can be shown that: , 
e(R,p) = k ( r r P )  w(r) dr +WPW(RI (7) 
0 
where & is the elasticity of individual demand at location r , d =  
dR/dp (the conjectural variation) and w(r) is a weighting 
function such that 
R $ w(r) dr = 1 
0 
(8) 
Thus, in the context of bus competition, for a given market share 
R, the elasticity of aggregate demand depends on a weighted 
average of the time specific demands and the conjectural 
variation from a fare change,&. 
3.3 Vertical Differentiation Models 
These models are based on quality differentiation, so that were 
any two goods offered at the same price then all customers would 
choose the same one (i.e. the higher quality product). This 
phenomenon may lead to the creation of natural oligopolies. A 
model of this type for the stage bus industry has been developed 
by Dodgson and Katsoulacos (1987), which itself draws heavily on 
the work of Shaked and Sutton (1982,1983). It is shown that if 
quality is assumed to be-a function of frequency and consumer 
preferences a function of income, market equilibrium may be 
determined in three stages. In stage 3 a given number of firms 
have entered the market and they offer distinct qualities. Given 
this, the firms' Nash equilibrium prices are determined. In stage 
2 the firm's optimal quality levels are determined given their 
Nash equilibrium prices, whilst in stage 1 the optimal entry 
decision can be determined. Given assumptions about income 
distribution, convexity of cost functions and size of the market 
it can be shown that there is a unique equilibrium involving only 
two firms. However, given this result it seems that the firms' 
failure to take into account the behaviour of their competitor is 
unrealistic. Moreover, given the assumption that frequencies are 
high anyway (and hence there are random arrivals) it is likely 
that consumers will have difficulties in perceiving quality 
differences whilst the assumption that consumers will remain 
loyal to the service that maximises their overall utility is only 
likely to occur given branded ticketing or different boarding 
points. For example, in Preston, excluding holders of branded 
tickets, around 90% of users boarded the first bus that arrived 
at their stop. Given these caveats it is not surprising that 
the model's predicted outcome of two firms, offering distinct 
qualities of service and charging different fares, does not 
appear to have occured in practice (although a lot depends on 
what is meant by distinct qualities). The model may be relevant 
in explaining inter-modal competition (e.g. bus v taxi and, 
possibly, bus v train) but does not seem too relevant in 
explaining competition within the bus market. 
Although the Dodgson and Katsoulacos model does not appear to 
explain the most common competitive practices, it does provide an 
explanation for the most likely market configuration for competed 
routes with high demand (i.e. a mixture of large and small 
buses). However, we only know of two instances (Gravesend and 
Leicester) where the minibus charges a premium fare. In addition, 
the welfare implications are worth considering. In comparing 
deregulated market equilibrium with that of a regulated public 
monopolist, it is found that welfare effects depend on: 
i. The weight given by the monopolist to retained profits as 
opposed to consumer surplus. The higher this is the more 
likely that all consumers benefit in the market equilibrium. 
ii. The behaviour of total unit costs as bus-service quality 
increases relative to the behaviour of consumers' 
willingness to pay. When total unit costs increase rapidly 
relative to willingness to pay for quality improvements by 
high income consumers, it is likely that all consumers will 
find their welfare reduced after deregulation. 
The resultant equivocal welfare implications are consistent with 
the earlier findings of Savage and Evans. 
3.4 Simulation Models 
One way of modelling the effects of deregulation is through the 
development of simulation models. Most work in this field has 
been based on studying the possible impact of minibuses. This 
work is described in more detail elsewhere (Martinez, 1988). Bly 
and Oldfield (1986) showed that minibuses would have a major 
impact, even if there was no variation in passengers' value of 
time, due to the increased frequencies and reduced journey times 
that could be offered. This work seemed to confirm the earlier 
findings of Walters (1979, 1982). Glaister developed a model 
that forecast the likely split of traffic between minibus and 
traditional bus services on a hypothetical London route (1985) 
and using real data for services in Aberdeen (1986). He concluded 
that small vehicles would play an important part in a deregulated 
industry even if, as he assumed, they operated at premium fares. 
In areas of high demand he concluded that big bus services would 
remain, at lower fares, and that the availability of a range of 
different service qualities at different fares (i.e. the same 
outcome as that of Dodgson and Katsoulacos) would cater for 
people with different values of time to the public benefit. In 
low flow areas it was concluded that big bus services would be 
substantially reduced to the detriment of the lower income 
groups. Galvez (1986) showed that the results were sensitive to 
the assumptions regarding the simulation of passengers boarding 
and alighting. Nash (1985) criticised the method of pegging load 
factors to a pre-determined break-even figure (required for the 
model to converge) and concluded that the possibility of 
minibuses driving out big buses in circumstances where such an 
outcome was against the public interest was greater than 
suggested by Glaister. 
The above simulation models appear to be justified in that the 
predicted increased role of minibuses has occured, with about 12 
thousand such vehicles being deployed in Great Britain in 1986/7 
(although the majority of these are not operated on stage 
services). However, the predicted quality/fare differentials, as 
already noted, have not emerged. In particular, if passengers 
board the first bus that arrives, there is little incentive for 
any operator to charge lower fares. Given this the high 
frequency, high fare outcome predicted by Evans seems most likely 
and social optimality is no longer guaranteed. A further 
criticism of the above models is that they fail to assess the 
effect of the qualitative differences between minibuses and big 
buses in terms of comfort, luggage space, staff courtesy etc. 
that surveys show many passengers believe important. There may be 
scope for stated preference and/or revealed preference 
experiments to quantify these effects. In addition, attention 
needs to be paid to the scope of minibuses for hail and ride 
operation and better penetration of residential areas which may 
lead to decreases in walk time. 
Similar models have also been applied to study the effect of 
competition between big buses, for example by Oldfield and 
Emerson (1986), although in this case results are at an 
aggregate level and hence optimisation methods rather than 
micro-simulation techniques are used. This model is developed for 
a single route and calculates the number of passengers using bus 
services as 
p = p O H e  
where G = generalised cost, e = generalised cost elasticity and o 
denotes the base situation. The proportion using bus i is then 
estimated as 
where i+l denotes next bus to arrive and a is a modal split 
parameter, which as the absolute value increases so does the 
proportion boarding the first bus. 
Two objective functions were tested (maximise net profit and 
maximise passengers for a given (normal) profit) Equilibrium is 
achieved through iteration, beginning with one company and then 
introducing competitors. It was found that competition would lead 
to an increase in services and fares, particularly if companies 
can reduce costs (and hence the results are similar to those of 
Evans). If the objective was to maximise passengers, a competitor 
is unlikely to gain more than a small foothold unless unit costs 
are lower than the incumbent by 8%. Competition is more likely to 
be enduring if the incumbent can respond by cutting costs (e.g. 
the unit costs of the incumbent fall as a linear function of the 
competitor's share) or both companies reduce unit costs 
asymptotically to some minimum value. if the incumbent was able 
to fully match the lower costs of the entrant, entry would be 
forestalled when unit costs are 65% of original costs. 
If an objective of maximising profits is considered different 
equilibria result. If an incumbent can match reductions in costs 
then equal shares result. Under a mixed system, where the 
incumbent maximises passengers and the entrant maximises profits 
(which may be a common occurence in urban areas where the 
incumbent is still publicly owned), similar results to those if 
the two companies were both maximising passengers are achieved. 
However, this assumes that both companies have similar unit 
costs. If the competitor has very low costs it can capture a 
large share of the market (capturing it completely at 60% cost 
level). 
In terms of competition between three firms, it is found that 
assuming a maximising passengers objective, no equilibrium can be 
achieved with the problem always being reduced to two firm 
competition. If the objective is profit maximising, equal shares 
will result if companies have similar unit costs (although 
patronage will be lower than in the two firm situation). If two 
firms lower costs then the third will be forced out of business 
when costs are 80% of original value. If one company has lower 
costs than the other two, it would have a large share of the 
market and would force one of the high cost operators out of the 
market when costs are 77% of original value. 
The importance of the above work is that it stresses the 
importance of managerial objectives (see Nash, 1978), illustrates 
the tendency towards duopoly and emphasises the role of 
competitive pressures in reducing incumbent's unit costs, as 
exemplified by the Scottish Bus Group, South Yorkshire Transport, 
Yorkshire Rider etc. etc. Clearly, such models can be readily 
extended to big bus/ small bus competition (for example the model 
developed by Frank Grimshaw for Yorkshire Rider), although the I 
main problems are the limited evidence on generalised cost I 
elasticities and the modal split parameter. Santoso (1988) has 
developed a similar simulation model for two routes in London 
considering capital reserves, fleet composition, fare system 
(flat or zonal) and manning arrangements (one or two person 
operated). Given an assumption that there are three groups of 
travellers with values of time of 144, 84 and 34 pence/hour (and 
work by Bradley et al. 1986 suggest this may not be very 
realistic), it was shown that the competitor's best strategir was 
minibus operation at high fares (i.e. the same result as 
Glaister) . 
It should be evident that the above models are similar to the bus 
optimisation models that originate with the work of Mohring 
(1972) and Turvey and Mohring (1975) and epitomised by the work 
of Jansson (1984). Jansson developed a series of equations that 
gave the optimal pricing relevant cost, frequency, vehicle size 
and fare. It was found that the first best solutions for urban 
bus would typically result in higher frequencies (particularly 
off-peak), lower or even zero fares (again particularly off-peak) 
and smaller vehicles. This would, however, also lead to increases 
in subsidy (typically representing 50-90% of costs). It is 
interesting that although bus deregulation has led to smaller 
vehicles and generally higher frequencies (particularly in inter 
peak periods), fares have also tended to increase, largely as a 
result of reduced subsidy. In any case Jansson acknowledges that 
high levels of subsidy may have adverse implications in terms of 
X-efficiency and equity and hence a second best solution might be 
provided by Ramsey pricing (=optimal commodity tax). In cases 
where apoly threaten, this might be based on the inverse 
elasticity rule ('the relative excess of price over marginal cost 
is proportional to the absolute value of the own price 
elasticity' ) . 
Given that we are critical of the above models, how do we explain 
the minibus revolution? In a closed market operators can choose 
the cost minimising bus size. In an open market it is important 
to dominate frequency as passengers board the first bus that 
arrives except in the case of return tickets and travelcards (the 
purchase of which will also depend on frequency). Minibuses are , 
the cheapest way of increasing frequency. As a result it may be 
that minibuses are not always deployed in a financially or 
socially efficient way (see Preston, 1989) 
4. A REVIEW OF BUS COMPETITION SINCE THE 1985 TRANSPORT ACT 
In this section we examine the extent of bus competition that has 
resulted from the 1985 Transport Act and in particular identify 
the extent of competition, the ambient circumstances that lead to 
competition, the competitive practices that have emerged and the 
likely market outcomes. 
4.1. Occurence of Com~etition 
For the purposes of this study we have defined urban areas as 
being free standing conurbations, cities or towns with at least a 
population of 40,000. Table 1 shows that, according to the 1981 
Census, there were 140 such towns in England and Wales (excluding 
London) and a further 19 in Scotland. According to our 
monitoring study 44 of these urban areas experienced active on- 
the-road competition affecting at least two main routes during 
the first two years of deregulation, representing 28% of all 
urban areas. However, this percentage varied substantially from 
42% in the North of England to only 18% in the South East of 
England. .- . - 
Table 1 Urban Areas Affected by Maior Comvetition . 
No. of No. affected by % affected by 
Urban areas major competition major competition 
North 43 
Midlands 31 
South East 4 5 
South West & Wales 21 
England & Wales 140 
Scotland 19 
Great Britain 159 
Britain 
In fact, even in areas where major competition has occurred it 
has not taken place on all routes, whilst virtually every urban 
area has experienced some form of minor competition on at least 
one route. Hence TRRL estimate that competition only affects 
something like 10% of routes (see, for example Hopkins and 
Oliver, 1986 et seq.). It should also be noted that competition 
has occurred in towns of less than 40,000 population (Salisbury, 
the towns of South Wales, Whitehaven) and even in rural areas 
(e.g. Scottish Highlands). 
4.2 Whv Does Comvetition Occur? 
Is competition just a random event or is there something 
systematic in the way that certain areas attract competition, 
whilst others do not? The key to answering this is to examine 
the nature of the two main participants; the incumbent and 
entrant firms . 
Table 2 
Analvsis of Maior Bus Comvetition in Great Britain 
Entrant PTC Municipal NBC/SBG Independant TOTAL 
Incumbent 
PTC - 1 5 6 12 
Municipal 1 2 16 7 26 
TOTAL 2 6 2 5 21 52 
N.B. The number of competitive cases exceeds 44 as in some 
instances there is more than one type of entrant. 
Table 2 shows that the main entrants have been from Scottish Bus 
Group (SBG)/ex-National Bus Group (NBC) subsidiaries and 
independents. The scope for entry by the PTCs and Municipals is 
limited by the 1985 Transport Act and has only occurred in a 
handful of cases. The incumbent firms that have suffered entry 
are in the main, the PTCs-and particularly the Municipals. In 
part this is because the territorial agreements of the regulated 
regime gave these firms undue protection and once these 
agreements were removed competition from neighbouring NBC/SBG 
companies and local independants was likely to occur (e.g. 
Glasgow, Nottingham). It also reflects that the PTCs and 
Municipals were operating in the largest urban areas and hence 
commercially the most attractive bus markets. The concentration 
of the PTCs/Municipals in the northern half of Great Britain 
explains some of the regional variations in competition observed 
in Table 1. Another possible explanation is that labour market 
conditions are more favourable to competition in the northern 
part of the country (i.e. labour availability higher and wage 
rates lower). 
At least initially, it was uncommon for operators within the same 
ownership group to compete with each other. This pattern has 
subsequently broken down with ex NBC companies competing with 
each other in Oxford, Poole and Salisbury and Municipals 
competing in Blackpool and Portsmouth. 
Incumbents are identified as victims if they have high costs 
and/or poor product reputation (for example, because of 
industrial disputes e.g. London Country North East, Plymouth 
Citybus). The independents and NBC/SBG companies have generally 
believed that they have lower costs and better quality products 
than the PTCs/Municipals. The Municipals have attracted more 
examples of large scale competition because (apart from the fact 
that there are more Municipals than PTCs!), other things being 
equal, small bus companies (e.g. Taff-Ely, Barrow) are perceived 
as being more vulnerable than large companies, although some 
companies may be perceived as being too big (e.g. GM Buses). A 
firm only enters the market if it believes it can win. If entry 
is at a large scale a response will be anticipated. Some 
independents have attempted to enter at a small scale thereby , 
hoping not to cause a response from the incumbent firm. By and 
large, such strategies have been unsuccessful (i.e. the 
incumbents have responded), except where the incumbent itself 
wishes to encourage some competition as a stimulus to wage 
reductions or productivity increases amongst the incumbent's own 
staff. An alternative strategy is for independents to act 
(either with or without collusion) collectively by each firm 
entering on a selection of routes in a belief that the incumbent 
will be unable to respond vigorously to all cases of entry. Such 
strategies have been particularly attractive where the incumbent 
operator has had intial operational difficulties (e.g. Liverpool, 
Manchester, Sheffield) and might be termed the 'vulture effect'. 
Entry to the market is common from firms with spare capacity due 
to seasonal variations e.g Southern Vectis or from firms involved 
in what are believed to be declining markets (which is the view 
of some small coach firms). Entry will often occur on the 
periphery of the incumbentls main market area, particularly if 
the entrant has a local reputation (e.g. Black Prince in Morley). 
Entry may also take place in area which are on the boundary of a 
number of incumbent operator's market territory (e.g. Pudsey) or 
in areas which, due to recent growth, were previously unserved 
(e.g. Poole) . 
There are, however, personal factors that have led to 
competition. The management of the entrant firm often have 
personal knowledge of the area being entered (e.g. Malcolm Robson 
in Preston, Harry Blundred in Oxford). This might also be seen 
as reducing the sunk costs that are related to the economies of 
experience that a skilled management team possesses (see 5.2). 
In addition, in many cases of competition the entrant will have 
former employees of the incumbent firm working for them. Hence 
firms that have recently shed labour (such as the PTCs) may be 
particularly vulnerable to attack. The most extreme examples are 
the workers co-operatives that have been established in, for 
example, Harrogate, Sheffied, Liverpool and Hertfordshire and 
consist almost entirely of ex-employees of the incumbent firm. 
4.3. What Forms Does Comvetition Take? 
Competition has tended to take the form of service wars with 
fares matching. The incumbent firm tends to take the role of 
price leader and the minibus is often used as the main 
competitive weapon. Fares are matched because of the industry's 
general adherence to area-wide fare scales (although this is 
beginning to break down in some areas of competition e.g. 
Harrogate, Liverpool), the belief that fares will be matched 
immediately and the perceived high risks of fare wars. 
Competition has concentrated on frequency because selective 
increases in service are easier to make and more difficult to 
match than changes in fare. In addition, wait time may be 
perceived as a larger and more sensitive component of generalised 
cost than fare and, due to imperfect knowledge and limited 
variation in values of time, passengers board the first bus that 
arrives hence making frequency the key to competition. 
Furthermore, firms may have managerial/behavioural reasons for 
expanding output rather cutting fares. 
The emphasis on service wars has led to fierce on-the-road 
competition. Headrunning, racing to stops, holding back, turning 
round and other 'curious old driving practices1 have been 
commonplace, although this competitive driving behaviour does 
tend to reduce with time. Particular trouble spots have proved to 
be bus stations and on-street bus stands in central areas. 
Following the experience of express coach deregulation where lack 
of access to coach stations acted as a barrier to entry, the 1985 
Act attempted to ensure entry for all to bus stations. However, 
in some instances access could be denied, although this is now 
less likely following the Office of Fair Trading's decision with 
respect to Newport (Isle of Wight) bus station, which is owned by 
the Southern Vectis bus company. It is, however, common for 
entrant firms to be refused access to canteen/office facilities 
at bus stations, for information points to be manned solely by 
the incumbent firm's staff (who give either no information or 
mis-information about the entrant firm's services) and for 
entrant firms to be located in the least attractive stands in the 
bus station and at some distance from the incumbent firm's rival 
services. At both bus stations and on-street stands common 
practices have included the blocking in of a rival's bus, 
permanently occupying a stand or employing couriers to persuade 
customers to use one company's buses in preference to another. 
It seems clear that some of these practices, and particularly 
headrunning, are symptomatic of wasteful competition. 
- 
.- 
Fare wars have been less common. The Trial Area of Hereford 
provides the best example of competition of this type (Evans, 
1988). There have been instances of fare cuts on particular 
routes in a number of areas (e.g. Accrington (Lancs), Colwyn Bay 
(Clwyd), Harwich (Essex) and Fort William (Highland)) but these 
tend to be shortlived. Competition in fares has been mainly 
related to branded ticketing such as system passes, return 
ticketing, multi-rider tickets or discount vouchers of the Green 
Shield Stamp type. These might be seen as an attempt by 
operators to develop strategic barriers to entry. In some areas, 
there has also been competition for concessionary fare 
passengers, particularly where the local schemes have been based 
on some form of tokens (e.g Bournemouth, Darlington, Harrogate). 
A trend towards reducing the distance related taper on fare 
scales has been detected, particularly in the Metropolitan areas, 
whilst off-peak fare schemes have become more common. However, 
market based fare scales do not appear to have emerged as yet, 
although a trend towards them may be detected in some areas (e.g 
Harrogate, Liverpool). Where incumbent operators have exact fare 
schemes, entrants often introduce services on which change is 
given (e.g Cleveland, Preston). 
The main innovation has been the minibus, with over 5000 vehicles 
deployed in 400 cities and towns. The main innovative features 
(aside from increased frequency) have been improved penetration 
of central and residential areas and the hail and ride facility. 
Services also tend to be faster than big bus services (and this 
reflected in brand names such as Zippy) and marketed as being 
more 'user-friendly'. Other innovations have involved crew- 
operated Routemasters in places as diverse as Glasgow, Carlisle, 
Northampton and Southampton, and limousines in Lincoln. One 
innovation that has failed to emerge is the shared-taxi, despite 
the scope for such develpments given by the 1985 Transport Act. 
Successful innovations are usually copied, for example, the 
United Transport Busesg minibus services in South Manchester were 
quickly immitated by Greater Manchester Buses. A peculiar 
competitive practice has been for one operator to copy the livery 
of a competing operator (e.g. County Durham, Kingston upon Hull). 
This might be seen as a move to reduce the effect of a rival 
operator's goodwill/brand loyalty and can upset the incumbent. 
For example, Ribble were very sensitive over Lancaster City 
Transport's use of red buses. 
Another peculiar practice has been that of operators attempting 
to raise a rival's costs. An early example was the behaviour of 
some PTCs during the intial stages of deregulation who witheld 
surplus buses from the second hand market. As a result it was 
hoped that the price of old buses would increase as their 
availability decreased, hence making entry to the local bus 
market more difficult. Another example, which is beginning to 
become more common as the labour market tightens, is the 
recruiting of a rival's staff by offering slightly better pay and 
conditions, (and advertising the fact on the back of buses). 
This practice contributed to the operational difficulties that 
United Transport Buses had in both Manchester and Preston. Of 
course, the success of such a policy is limited by the fact that 
it also affects the firmgs own costs. 
4.4 Market Outcomes 
The competitive outcomes may be as follows (note this list is not 
intended to be exhaustive): 
i. Two or more operators serve a route, either at similar 
fare/frequencies or at different fares and/or frequencies. 
This outcome will normally result in equal spacing but 
headrunning can continue over a long period (e.g the 
competition between Busways and Tyne and Wear Omnibus). 
What is important is whether this result is due to a non 
co-operative equilibrium, tacit collusion or temporary 
disequilibrium, with only the first likely to be a stable 
result. 
ii. One operator serves a route, being either the incumbent or 
the entrant. Examples of where the entrant has withdrawn 
include South Wales and Walsall. This might be as the 
result of an independent company going into liquidation 
(e.g. Cream Line Services in West Glamorgan), redeployment 
of vehicles elsewhere or withdrawal from the stage bus 
industry. Alternatively, an incumbent may withdraw, for 
example Lincolnshire Road Car in Grimsby (depot closure) or 
Trent in Loughborough (joint company formed with Leicester 
Citybus) 
iii. Two operators serve a market area but with routes operated 
by either one or the other. This might be done through 
registered joint operating agreements (although competitive 
pressures have led to a reduction in these types of 
agreements e.g. the break down of the joint operating 
agreement in Lancaster) or through tacit collusion (as 
believed, by some, to exist in most of the Metropolitan 
areas). 
iv. Only one operator serves a market, thus holding a 
territorial monopoly. Merger/acquisition appears to be the 
method that many firms are using to acquire a territorial 
monopoly (e.g. Badgerline, PMT) 
In the above, it should be noted that commercial and subsidised 
services might be thought of as different products leading to up 
to 16 outcomes (although outcome i. will only be relevant for 
subsidised services if a route tender is broken up into, for 
example, daytime, evening and Sunday work). 
It should be noted that such outcomes will be achieved in what is 
a generally volatile market, particularly for small operators. 
Gomez-Ibanez et al. (1987) note that between November 1985 and 
April 1987 1356 firms remained in local bus services throughout 
the period, there were 662 'deaths' and 738 'births1. Of the 662 
deaths, 121 ceased trading whilst 541 concentrated on other 
aspects of the bus and coach business (private hire and 
express). Of the 738 births, 161 were new operators (including 13 
companies formed as the result of splitting NBC subsidiaries and 
77 taxi companies), whilst 577 were previously private hire 
and/or express operators. 
- 
.- 
5. MARKET STRUCTURE 
5.1 Market ~onficrurations 
In this section a number of theoretical market structures will be 
examined and their relevance to the urban stage bus industry 
assessed. This analysis will be at a basic level but should 
provide some interesting insights. 
Perfect competition depends on a number of assumptions that 
rarely exist in reality. These include: 
i. There is no government regulation. This was clearly not the 
case for stage bus between 1930 and 1986, whilst quality 
regulation and some quantity regulation remains. 
ii. There are a large number of buyers and sellers. As a result 
of quantity regulation in the bus industry, there has 
traditionally been a small number of sellers, although a 
large number of buyers. 
iii. Products are homogeneous. We have seen that the bus 
industry does have differentiated products. 
iv. Both buyers and sellers have perfect knowledge. It is, 
however, evident that sellers only have limited knowledge 
about demand characteristics, whilst buyers have imperfact 
knowledge of the bus services available to them. 
v. Sellers are profit maximisers and buyers act rationally 
(utility maximisers). It is evident that certain large bus 
companies may not be pure profit maximisers but may be 
sales maximisers, so that managerial models may be 
appropriate (Baumol, 1962, Dasgupta and Stiglitz, 
1980). Such models might incorporate the effect of research 
and development (unlikely to be too important for the stage 
bus industry), advertising and marketing. In addition, 
given imperfect knowledge, behavioral models may be 
appropriate (Cyert and March, 1963). 
Of the other assumptions, by and large, there is perfect mobility 
of factors of production (although the effects of unionised 
labour and concentrated second hand bus market should be noted), 
whilst there is now also relatively free entry and exit. 
From the above, it is apparent that the stage bus industry, like 
most industries, is an example of imperfect competition. Clarke 
(1961) developed the concept of effective (or workable) 
competition in which, despite imperfections, competitive results 
still emerge. Requirements include that: 
i. Short run marginal costs are less than average costs so that 
if volume shrinks costs will not reduce proportionally. This 
encourages defensive strategies. 
ii. A single firm demand function is more elastic than the 
demand schedule for a group or industry (i.e. there are 
cross elasticites),--but slopes in such a way as tcr limit 
tendencies to drive price below cost. Hence there is some 
scope for aggressive strategies. 
iii. There is a substantial number of firms small enough relative 
to the whole market to have strong competitive incentives 
and economically strong enough to make their competitive 
pressure count. There should be a diversity of firms, with 
the relationship between 'pace setting' firms and the 'bulk' 
being important (e.g. in terms of innovations). 
iv. Uncertainties and delayed competive reactions may ensure 
that competition with limited numbers is possible without 
ending in an oligopoly stalemate. 
v. There are certain standards of business attitudes/morals and 
a certain degree of customer competence. 
All the above assumptions apply to the stage bus industry to some 
extent, although we might be concerned about the tendency to 
drive price below cost in aggressive competition, the lack of 
delayed reactions (see 5.2) and some aspects of producer/consumer 
competence. 
A possible alternative market structure might be that of 
monopolistic competition, particulary as the bus industry's 
products, although differentiated, are close substitutes, whilst 
there is free entry and exit and prices of factors and technology 
are given (to some extent). However, due to regulation there is 
again only a small number of sellers, profit maximisation may be 
doubted, particularly in the short term where predatory behaviour 
may occur, firms do not know their demand curves with certainty 
and the long run can not be considered to consist of a number of 
short run periods which are assumed identical. 
Alernatively, monopoly might be the most relevant market 
structure. This was obviously the case as regulation led to 
single sellers. However, with deregulation this should no longer 
be the case, particularly as bus does have some close substitutes 
(rail, car, walk), does not have major barriers to entry nor does 
it exhibit economies of scale (it is often argued that the bus 
industry exhibits constant returns to scale (e.g. Lee and 
Steadman, 1970)). However, monopoly might still exist where: 
i. A market might not otherwise be served. A monopoly might be 
justified where the various sectors of a market have demand 
curves which, when added together, give a total market 
demand which when added together lies at all levels of 
output below the LAC of the firm (see Figure 3). However, 
if a monopoly exists, price discrimination may be 
practiced with high price (PI) charged to the inelastic 
sector of the market and low price (P2) set for the elastic 
sector. Thus total revenue is OXP'P and the monopolists 
excess profit is denoted by the shaded area. The 'rich' 
sector of the market subsidises the 'poor1 sector in order 
to make production possible (and this argument may be used 
to justify cross subsidy). In practice, price discrimination 
in the bus industry is normally limited to concessionary 
fares and peak/off peak pricing, although cross - subsidy, 
although much reduced, is still likely to be widespread. The 
above arguments only apply where demand is low i.e.. they 
will be most applicable to rural areas, although they may 
also apply to some urban markets (e.g. circumferential 
routes). 
ii. The incumbent bus company adopts limit pricing policy, heavy 
advertising or continuous product differentiation (or more 
likely all three at the same time) in order to forestall 
entry. 
From the above it appears that market configurations relevant to 
the bus industry are those based on competition between the few 
and hence the emphasis on oligopoly models in section 3 seems 
justified. However, it may be argued that competition between the 
few is likely to lead to socially inefficient results. The 
counter-argument to this, used in the llBuses" White Paper, is 
provided by the theory of contestable markets, which itself might 
be thought of as an extension of the limit pricing theory 
oligopoly models developed in the 1940s and 1950s by Bain. 
5.2 Contestabilitv Theorv 
Expressed simply this theory states that provided certain 
conditions hold a socially efficient equilibrium may exist with 
only one (or a few) active firms in the market (Baumol, 1982). 
These assumptions include that: 
i. Potential entrants have access to all production techniques 
available to incumbents. This is generally true for the bus 
industry. 
ii. Potential entrants are not prevented from trying to 
attract the incumbents' customers i.e. there are no + 
barriers to entry. It has been suggested by some that 
access to bus stations and the use of travelcards have 
acted as barriers to entry (Meadowcroft and Pickup, 1987). 
iii. Entry decisions may be reversed without cost i.e. there are 
no barriers to exit (although in theory there is a 42 day 
delay) and no major sunk costs. In terms of sunk costs, it 
does appear (e.g. from Zippy's experience in Preston) that 
there are sunk costs in terms of training staff 
(managerial, administrative and platform). Such 'economies 
of experience1 might enable incumbents to earn a degree of 
monopoly rent. Moreover, as bus industry activities are 
multiproduct by nature there may be leconomies of scope1, 
where incumbents have lower unit costs from producing a 
range of outputs. Lastly, we have assumed that there are 
constant returns in the bus industry although major 
operators are now emphasisising the economies of scale of 
central functions such as engineering, computing, 
purchasing and marketing. It could be that under a 
regulated system the existence of slack payments in the 
largest (and hence most organisationally complex) firms 
outweighed any scale effects (see, for example, Button and 
OIDonnell, 1985). However, deregulation has led to changes 
in the goals of firms that have made such slack payments 
less acceptable. - - 
iv. Incumbent firms can not respond sufficiently quickly to 
entry by reducing prices. This manifestly is not the' case 
for the bus industry, as in theory an operator can respond 
within 24 hours, although if the entrant has manipulated 
the registration system it could take longer. The general 
inapplicability of this assumption is seen to be a major 
weakness of contestability theory (Schwartz and Reynolds, 
1983), although Starkie and Starrs (1984) argue that if 
price adjustments are costly violation of this assumption 
will not be important. However, price adjustment for the 
stage bus industry is relatively costless. A more important 
consideration might be that excessive pricing will not only 
attract competition but might also lead to loss of goodwill 
(the 'chagrin effect1 of Bhagwati (1970), which might exist 
in, for example, Merseyside). 
Baumol, Panzer and Willig (1982) established a set of guidelines 
to establish whether contestability exists in practice: 
i. Determination of the cost minimizing structure of the 
industry. In particular, it is needed to assess the profit 
region for different output vectors (for example, 
commercial and tendered services could be thought of as 
different outputs), the set of output vectors at which a 
firm's returns to scale are exhausted and the degree of 
trans ray convexity, which indicates the degree of 
complementarity (= economies of scope). In particular it is 
necessary to determine those outputs which can most 
economically be provided by a monopoly and those which are 
'naturally competitive'. Our review so far has not resolved 
this question. 
ii. Determination of degree of contestability, This is related 
to costs of entry, exit, sunk costs (role of resale 
markets and use in other activities ('fungibility1)) and 
the affect of size of the potential entrant. There are some 
indications that the stage bus industry is not perfectly 
contestable. It is not clear, however, to what extent a 
limited degree of contestability will lead to deviations 
from optimal efficiency. 
iii. Determination of obstacles to contestability and evaluation 
of the difficulty of their reduction or elimination. 
Legislation could limit the effects of bus station 
ownership, travelcard schemes, joint ventures and immediate 
price reaction (i.e. the 'strategic' barriers to entry). 
'Innocent' barriers such as those stemming from product 
reputation, bankruptcy constraints and firms1 objectives 
are more difficult to legislate for (although predatory 
behaviour can be limited), as are the effects of sunk costs 
(although start-up schemes may have some effect here). 
iv. Determination of whether sustainable configurations for the 
industry exist (i.e. whether a socially efficient 
configuration can exist over all time periods). 
Unsustainability may result from: 
a) public policies that impose special impediments on the 
incumbent (for example an obligation to serve quantities 
demanded at prevailing prices, as may be the position with 
many PTC and Municipal operators). 
b) existence of a natural oligopoly (which to some extent 
the stage bus industry may be (e.g. the Dodgson and 
Katsoulacos model)) with demand such as to rule out a 
market clearing configuration that minimises average ray 
costs. 
c) economies of scope are insufficiently strong and 
economies of scale sufficiently strong so that specialized 
firms can take advantage of favourable demand conditions 
despite the cost advantages of a multiproduct supplier. 
v. Qualitative and quantitative description of sustainable 
configuratLons. If no sustainable configuration exists then 
inhibition/prevention of entry (i.e. quantity regulation) 
or prevention of strategic entry may be needed. 
vi. Identification of any substantial welfare problems 
associated with sustainable configurations. The continued 
existence of quality regulation and the creation of the 
tendering system is indicative of the importance of 
externalities in the stage bus industry. 
vii. Description of institutional inhibitions to the adoption of 
efficient inter-temporal price patterns. All activities 
should pass the Areeda-Turner test of predatory behaviour 
in that prices must equal (or be greater than) both 
marginal and average incremental costs. 
Empirical evidence on the degree of contestability of the 
transport industry has concentrated on the airline industry with 
the work of Bailey and Panzer (1981) and Starkie and Starrs 
(1984) broadly vindicating the theory, although the results of 
Graham et al. (1983) are more equivocal. In the U.K. the main 
work so far has been on the contestability of the express coach 
industry (Button and Pearman, 1984, Jaffer and Thompson, 1986). 
The work by the latter indicated that 'the effective competition 
hypothesis does not provide a good explanation' and that 
'incumbents have been able to maintain a price premium over 
entrants and that in markets where entrants have been able to 
achieve a significant market share, prices are significantly 
lowert. Factors that limited the contestability of the express 
coach industry include National Expressts control of the main 
terminals and the existence of an extensive network of agencies, 
the policy of fare matching (not copied by the Scottish Bus 
Group and, interestingly, the express market in Scotland was 
found to be more contestable than elsewhere) and the emergence of 
joint ventures with some of the main competitors. 
Similar analysis of the stage bus industry based on data for 
Hereford between 1981 and 1987, provided by Evans (1988), shows 
that fare and frequency are related to market structure, hence 
suggesting that the industry is not perfectly contestable 
(Preston, 1988). However, these results are distorted by problems 
of transitional disequilibrium and short-run predatory pricing 
and output levels. The fact that in 1987 fares were generally 
lower and frequencies higher than in 1981 even though the 
dominant operator had maintained its market share does suggest 
that the effective competi-tion hypothesis has some relevance. The 
key question has to be to what extent do deviations from perfect 
contestability lead to social inefficiencies ? Another factor has 
to be to what extent is potential competition seen as a credible 
threat ? For example, following deregulation Yorkshire Rider saw, 
in the event wrongly, entry from UTB as very likely. As a 
results, frequencies were increased through minibus deployment, 
fares maintained at low levels and costs reduced, all responses 
that are consistent with contestability theory. However, 
potentially UTB could have entered the bus market anywhere in 
Great Britain (apart from London), so in theory all bus operators 
should have re-acted with the same vigour as Yorkshire Rider, 
which does not appear to have been the case. 
6. CONCLUSIONS 
It has beeen shown that the stage bus industry in the UK has been 
affected by a series of regulatory changes, the latest of which 
has been the policy of deregulation (in fact, limited regulation) 
implemented by the 1985 Transport Act. These regulatory changes 
can be interpreted within a theoretical framework, as shown by 
section 2.2. Section 2.3 went on to show how deregulation has 
been accompanied by other developments, in particular 
privatisation and reduced subsidy levels. 
In section 3 a series of inter-related models of bus competition 
were examined and categorised. These were: classical oligopoly 
models, horizontal product differentiation (or spatial 
competition) models, vertical product differentiation models and 
optimisation/simulation models. The main results from these 
models was that depending on circumstances, in particular the 
degree of optimality of the regulated regime and the extent of 
cost reductions in the deregulated regime, a policy of 
deregulation could either lead to welfare gains or losses. 
However, in terms of fare/frequency combinations two outcomes 
appear possible: 
i. Deregulation will lead to overall high fare and high 
frequency combinations in areas of heavy demand with areas 
of low demand possibly left unserved. This was broadly the 
findings of Evans' spatial competition model and Oldfield 
and Emmersonls optimisation model. 
ii. Deregulation will lead to distinct qualities being offerred 
at different fares. In particular, high frequencies (based 
on minibuses) will be offered at high fares for those with 
high values of time, whilst low frequencies (based on big 
buses) with low fares will be offered for those with low 
values of time. This was the finding of the quality 
competition model of Dodgson and Katsoulacos and the 
simulation models of Glaister. 
Section 4's review of competitive behaviour since deregulation 
came into force on October 26th, 1986 suggests that an outcome 
of type i. has been much more evident than that of type ii. 
However, the simulation models did successfully predict the 
increased deployment of minibuses. A range of additional outcomes 
were identified that were encompassed by neither of the outcomes 
given above, although many of these are likely to be associated 
with short run behaviour . -- . - 
The main criticism of the models that were reviewed was that they 
were generally based on a number of restrictive assumptions. In 
particular: 
i. Naive assumptions concerning the reaction of other firms to 
a change in frequency and/or fare by one firm in the 
market. Given an oligopolistic (or even duopolistic) 
configuration even on routes with high demand, it seems 
likely that a firm will modify its behaviour in the light 
of behaviour by other firms. 
ii. The assumptions that preferences are based solely on 
income and that there is a wide range of values of time for 
bus travellers that underpins much of the work of Glaister 
might be questioned. 
iii. The assumptions of perfect knowledge on behalf of both 
operators and users appear unrealistic. This may mean that 
operators act as satisficers (for example through adopting 
cost plus pricing) rather than optimisers. Moreover, 
uncertainty will affect customer behaviour. For example, 
the tendency to board the first bus that arrives, 
regardless of cost (assuming the cost difference is not too 
major), is related to uncertainty about when the next bur 
will arrive. It is this uncertainty, exhibited even with 
high frequency services, which are vulnerable to bunching, 
that has probably limited the outcomes predicted by Dodgson 
and Katsoulacos. A way of implicitly modelling this effect 
is to develop a probabilistic approach (Hey, 1981). 
Another weakness of the models that have been reviewed is that 
they fail to take into account the interaction between the 
commercial and tendered bus markets. A framework that might be 
fruitfully applied to both of these markets is game theory. This 
would involve the development of a pay-off matrix (see Figure 
4), which is based on the results of Firm 1 and 2's strategies. 
For a commercial route this strategy would be based on 
fare/frequency combinations, whilst for a tendered route it would 
be based on tender bids. In both cases the pay-off would be 
expected profit. The most likely behavioural rule would be that 
each firm expects the worst from its rival i.e. a maximin 
strategy. In addition, it is likely that the learning process 
will lead to different strategies being adopted round by round (a 
process that is already evident in the tendered market). It is 
likely that we are dealing with a non zero sum game, whilst again 
the assumption that each firm knows, with certainty, the exact 
value of the pay-off of each strategy is unrealistic. We may 
expect a range of results for each counter strategy of the rival, 
each with an associated probability. The applicability of gaming 
theory to oligopolistic behaviour has been well researched (see, 
for example, Friedman, 1986). It should be noted that the theory 
can be extended to n-firms, whilst third parties might be thought 
of as dealers rather than players (this is the role, for example. 
of PTEs/County Councils in the tendering process). 
However, theory of games is essentially a descriptive tool, in 
order for it to become a predictive tool the relationship between 
pay-offs and strategies need to be modelled. This is where the 
oligopolistic models discussed in section 3 might be applied. 
Other possible ways forward might be provided by the concepts of 
disequilibrium economics, and managerial and behavioural 
theories, although it is likely that this would rapidly lead to 
complex (and hence unusable) model forms. The emphasis on 
oligopolistic configurations, at least for routes with heavy 
demand, is vindicated by the analysis of market structure in 
section 5. This section concludes that the concept of perfect 
contestability does not appear to be applicable to the stage bus 
industry, although models of imperfect contestability might be 
worth exploring. 
Finally, it should be noted that there is a tendency for the 
models that have been reviewed, in particular those of Savage, 
Evans and Nashls interpretation of Glaisterls results, to 
indicate that a deregulated competitive regime will lead to non 
optimal welfare results. This seems likely to, eventually, lead 
to pressures for further regulatory reform. This pressure has 
been reinforced by the 1986/87 statistics that show that bus 
usage in London has gone up by 1.4%, whilst in the rest of Great 
Britain it has gone down by 7.3%, although clearly some of this 
is due to reduced levels of subsidy. This regulatory reform might 
be similar to the tendering out process that is being undertaken 
in London or, de-facto, that is being administered by National 
Express for most of the express coach market in England and 
Wales. Such a system would make the regulatory system in Britain 
more akin to the franchise systems common in continental Europe 
than the previous system of arbitration. However, it does seem, 
that in the short term at least, the pressures for deregulation 
will continue, with the 1985 Transport Act being extended to 
London in the near future. 
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A A A - Social Welfare Maximisation subject 
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B - Passenger mile maximisation subject 
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C - Profit Maximisation 
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FIGURE 4 AN EXAMPLE OF GAMES THEORY (Based on Vickers. 1985). 
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Firm 1's pay-off is given in the bottom left hand corner. Firm 
2's pay-off is given in the top right hand corner. In this 
example, Firm 2 might be considered the entrant and a policy of 
fares matching may be assumed . Assumimg a minimax strategy, the 
most likely outcome is that both firms will operate at high 
frequency, even though higher pay-offs would be achieved by both 
firms operating at high frequency even though higher pay-offs 
would be achieved by both firms operating at lower frequencies. 
This example, based on 'the prisoner's dilemma) illustrates the 
collusive pressures that exist in the bus industry. 
